Licensing Notes - introduction to the essential facilities doctrine

In this note, we prepare for our coverage of the Trinko case with an introduction to the essential facilities doctrine.

Let’s start will two fairly clear propositions about patent and copyright law in the United States. The first is that the proprietor of a patent or a copyright controls the extent to which she exploits her intellectual property. She need never manufacture or publish; there is no working requirement in U.S. law. And the proprietor may assign all or part of her IP rights to others. But there is no obligation to do so. A patent or copyright holder need not share her IP with anyone. To use the language of antitrust, there is no duty to deal, no duty to license.

Now the second proposition. A proprietor of a patent or copyright who chooses to exploit her intellectual property right -- whether directly or by means of a license to another -- may charge ‘what the market will bear.’ There are no limits -- imposed by either intellectual property law or antitrust law -- on the amount of license royalties that can be demanded.

Both of these propositions -- the freedom to license (or not) and the freedom to set royalties -- are seen to flow naturally from the very monopolies that patent and copyright law establish. A patent or copyright generates a set of exclusive rights. To require the proprietor to license to another is inconsistent with those exclusivities and undercuts the monopoly the intellectual property creates. A limit on royalties reduces the economic reward conferred by Congress on authors and inventors.

Talent Wants to be Free: Why We Should Learn to Love Leaks, Raids, and Free-Riding by Orly Lobel

Orly Lobel is not writing about love in Talent Wants to be Free, but she’s not terribly far off topic, for she writes about the suffocating attachments firms can form with their employees. The heart-sickened are told to let go -- and perhaps their beloveds will come back to them. This may be the better course, but it isn’t easy and it certainly isn’t what most of us do (with our insecurities and covetousness). Firms are jealously possessive of their key employees; this is a social fact. Lobel challenges these firms (and the responding legislatures) to consider whether they are indeed pursuing their own best interests by clinging.

Lobel usefully gathers a variety of legal doctrines and instruments into a basket she calls “human capital controls” -- and for this alone her book should be read. Human capital controls include IP and quasi-IP (trade secrets and know-how) rights, as well as a host of contractual features: non-competes, non-disclosure agreements, compensation arrangements (option grants and forfeitures) and post-termination obligations. Together, these elements bind the talented employee to her employer. The orthodox justification for these controls is that they promote firm investment in innovation, including investment in human capital -- that is, in forming the movable productivity of the employee herself. It is the workplace, and not the university, where most valuable human capital is created.

Lobel directly investigates the logic of control -- which is easily conflated with ownership. By controlling human capital, firms capture some of its produce. Creative workers create. In addition, firms withhold these assets from their competitors. According to the received view, employees are rivalrous goods. Lobel challenges this notion (though perhaps not explicitly) -- while we are not public goods, our creations often are.

The Org: The Underlying Logic of the Office by Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan

It feels odd to be composing this review of Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan’s The Org in the days following Ronald Coase’s passing. Coase was an unusually creative and influential thinker - one who identified some basic truths of organizational life that had not been generally recognized: the kind of simple things that, once pointed out, cannot fail to be seen.

Coase and the work that followed Coase form much of the subject matter of The Org, a book-length meditation by Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan on the science of the organization. Indeed, Fisman and Sullivan launch the book with the story behind Coase’s posing of the grand question: “Why orgs?” Young Coase travels to Chicago, meets with managers, and reads the Chicago phone book. He is struck by the range of scale and activities pursued by the firms he finds. Why then, asks Coase (and ask Fisman and Sullivan), are some activities conducted within firms and others between firms (that is, via the market)? Coase’s answer (transaction costs) may or may not be correct (‘transaction costs’ always seemed to me to be a convenient label for a still elusive explanation, almost a tautology); what is important is the question.

Organizations are mysterious. We fit them on like suits of clothing - and instinctively know how to push and pull their levers. Fisman and Sullivan focus on what happens within the firm - how organizations compel human agents (because that’s what we are) to pursue organizational goals. The resort to organization is by and large a given. At this point, they collect the principal/agent mysteries that form much of the challenge to understanding how firms work. Fisman and Sullivan do not confine themselves to business organizations in The Org - indeed their best coverage involves organizations that are not business firms: the Baltimore police department, Methodist churches and the military.