It would not be difficult to convince the various constituencies arrayed against the expansion of intellectual property rights to support the removal of the IP chapter from the projected U.S.-European Union free trade agreement (known as TTIP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). Open source advocates, First Amendment partisans, pirates and free riders, as well as ordinary American consumers, see little to be gained from yet another international commitment to strong IP. Eliminating the IP chapter from TTIP should appeal to the U.S. IP industries as well. There is little to gain, and perhaps much to lose, in including an IP component to TTIP. IP zealots (and I'm talking to you, Hollywood) might be better served to await a better day.
As I argued in part 1 of this essay, there is little ground the European counterparty is politically willing or able to give in any TTIP IP negotiations. The TTIP IP chapter is a lightning rod for anti-globalists - and the European Parliament will guard the populist victory it won in quashing ACTA. And neither the United States nor the European Union seem ready to undertake the extremely difficult task of harmonizing substantive IP law across the Atlantic. The Americans and the Europeans seem to share a resignation to let "vivre la différence” in substantive IP rules; each of course would be satisfied by a wholesale capitulation to its respective IP model, yet each recognizes the impossibility of such an outcome. Impending EU substantive IP harmonization - in patent and copyright - pursued through the EU legislative process might be a more favorable opportunity to highlight (with a light touch, of course) the gains to be achieved through transatlantic IP convergence (admittedly moving EU IP law closer to U.S. models).
Leaked reports suggest some Europeans see possibilities for U.S. movement in TTIP with regard to geographical indications (GIs). Perhaps. But the United States clearly recognizes the intense desire of certain European interests for a stronger GI regime (especially with regard to wines). The United States will likely make painful demands of the European Union before making concessions on GIs.
In the end, there is not much new nor important that can form the IP chapter of TTIP beyond simply restating the ongoing general commitment of the United States and the European Union to a high standard of IP protection. And there is a downside to a modest agreement (again from the perspective of those U.S. industries seeking a global advancement in the protection and enforcement of IP rights).
Monday, April 28, 2014
Monday, April 7, 2014
TTIP’s IP Chapter: Nothing to be Gained (Part 1)
President Obama announced in his 2013 State of the Union address that negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a United States-European Union free trade agreement, were on. There is something silly about calling a trade agreement a 'partnership;' the on-going Trans-Pacific Partnership uses this same label. But the folks in Washington are more clever than you and me: they know that the older style ‘free trade agreement’ (FTA) would be DOA in Congress.
TTIP’s central features follow the FTA model. Little thought seems to have been applied to fixing the provisional TTIP agenda: TTIP would provide for zero-level tariffs for U.S.-EU trade, an address various non-tariff barriers between the United States and the EU, introduce a misbegotten investor-state arbitration mechanism, and include an intellectual property chapter. It appears now that little positive can be achieved from inserting an IP chapter into TTIP. It is at best a waste of time -- and could undercut U.S. and EU IP efforts in other fora. What were they thinking?
In this first post, I examine the constraints faced by European Union negotiators. The EU has precious little room for maneuver on the IP front; IP provisions can only attract and intensify opposition to the entire TTIP package. These political limits are clear to the Europeans; they are perhaps underappreciated by the U.S. proponents of TTIP's IP coverage.
TTIP’s central features follow the FTA model. Little thought seems to have been applied to fixing the provisional TTIP agenda: TTIP would provide for zero-level tariffs for U.S.-EU trade, an address various non-tariff barriers between the United States and the EU, introduce a misbegotten investor-state arbitration mechanism, and include an intellectual property chapter. It appears now that little positive can be achieved from inserting an IP chapter into TTIP. It is at best a waste of time -- and could undercut U.S. and EU IP efforts in other fora. What were they thinking?
In this first post, I examine the constraints faced by European Union negotiators. The EU has precious little room for maneuver on the IP front; IP provisions can only attract and intensify opposition to the entire TTIP package. These political limits are clear to the Europeans; they are perhaps underappreciated by the U.S. proponents of TTIP's IP coverage.
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