Licensing Notes - introduction to the essential facilities doctrine

In this note, we prepare for our coverage of the Trinko case with an introduction to the essential facilities doctrine.

Let’s start will two fairly clear propositions about patent and copyright law in the United States. The first is that the proprietor of a patent or a copyright controls the extent to which she exploits her intellectual property. She need never manufacture or publish; there is no working requirement in U.S. law. And the proprietor may assign all or part of her IP rights to others. But there is no obligation to do so. A patent or copyright holder need not share her IP with anyone. To use the language of antitrust, there is no duty to deal, no duty to license.

Now the second proposition. A proprietor of a patent or copyright who chooses to exploit her intellectual property right -- whether directly or by means of a license to another -- may charge ‘what the market will bear.’ There are no limits -- imposed by either intellectual property law or antitrust law -- on the amount of license royalties that can be demanded.

Both of these propositions -- the freedom to license (or not) and the freedom to set royalties -- are seen to flow naturally from the very monopolies that patent and copyright law establish. A patent or copyright generates a set of exclusive rights. To require the proprietor to license to another is inconsistent with those exclusivities and undercuts the monopoly the intellectual property creates. A limit on royalties reduces the economic reward conferred by Congress on authors and inventors.

TTIP's IP Chapter: Nothing to be Gained (Part 2)

It would not be difficult to convince the various constituencies arrayed against the expansion of intellectual property rights to support the removal of the IP chapter from the projected U.S.-European Union free trade agreement (known as TTIP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). Open source advocates, First Amendment partisans, pirates and free riders, as well as ordinary American consumers, see little to be gained from yet another international commitment to strong IP. Eliminating the IP chapter from TTIP should appeal to the U.S. IP industries as well. There is little to gain, and perhaps much to lose, in including an IP component to TTIP. IP zealots (and I'm talking to you, Hollywood) might be better served to await a better day.

As I argued in part 1 of this essay, there is little ground the European counterparty is politically willing or able to give in any TTIP IP negotiations. The TTIP IP chapter is a lightning rod for anti-globalists - and the European Parliament will guard the populist victory it won in quashing ACTA. And neither the United States nor the European Union seem ready to undertake the extremely difficult task of harmonizing substantive IP law across the Atlantic. The Americans and the Europeans seem to share a resignation to let "vivre la différence” in substantive IP rules; each of course would be satisfied by a wholesale capitulation to its respective IP model, yet each recognizes the impossibility of such an outcome. Impending EU substantive IP harmonization - in patent and copyright - pursued through the EU legislative process might be a more favorable opportunity to highlight (with a light touch, of course) the gains to be achieved through transatlantic IP convergence (admittedly moving EU IP law closer to U.S. models).

Leaked reports suggest some Europeans see possibilities for U.S. movement in TTIP with regard to geographical indications (GIs). Perhaps. But the United States clearly recognizes the intense desire of certain European interests for a stronger GI regime (especially with regard to wines). The United States will likely make painful demands of the European Union before making concessions on GIs.

In the end, there is not much new nor important that can form the IP chapter of TTIP beyond simply restating the ongoing general commitment of the United States and the European Union to a high standard of IP protection. And there is a downside to a modest agreement (again from the perspective of those U.S. industries seeking a global advancement in the protection and enforcement of IP rights).

TTIP’s IP Chapter: Nothing to be Gained (Part 1)

President Obama announced in his 2013 State of the Union address that negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a United States-European Union free trade agreement, were on. There is something silly about calling a trade agreement a 'partnership;' the on-going Trans-Pacific Partnership uses this same label. But the folks in Washington are more clever than you and me: they know that the older style ‘free trade agreement’ (FTA) would be DOA in Congress.

TTIP’s central features follow the FTA model. Little thought seems to have been applied to fixing the provisional TTIP agenda: TTIP would provide for zero-level tariffs for U.S.-EU trade, an address various non-tariff barriers between the United States and the EU, introduce a misbegotten investor-state arbitration mechanism, and include an intellectual property chapter. It appears now that little positive can be achieved from inserting an IP chapter into TTIP. It is at best a waste of time -- and could undercut U.S. and EU IP efforts in other fora. What were they thinking?

In this first post, I examine the constraints faced by European Union negotiators. The EU has precious little room for maneuver on the IP front; IP provisions can only attract and intensify opposition to the entire TTIP package. These political limits are clear to the Europeans; they are perhaps underappreciated by the U.S. proponents of TTIP's IP coverage.

Extraterritorial Government Use of U.S. Process Patents after Zoltek

The federal government -- and its contractors and subcontractors -- have long enjoyed an effective ‘compulsory license’ for the use or manufacture of inventions covered by a U.S. patent. 28 U.S.C. §1498 relaxes the government’s sovereign immunity and supplies a special remedy to the patent holder. The patent holder may recover reasonable compensation from the federal government for the use or manufacture. Thus, a government contractor can carry out a contract without concern for an infringement action; the government will answer any patent holder’s claims.

The operation of Section 1498 applies to both product and process patents. Section 1498 contains an express limitation to any claims ‘arising in a foreign country.’ This limitation, as well as the territorial limitation found in the basic patent infringement statute [35 U.S.C. §271(a)], and their interpretation with respect to process patents, were the basis of the dispute between Zoltek Corporation and the federal government.

The eventual resolution of the Zoltek litigation by the Federal Circuit [672 F.3d 1309] settles various questions of interpretation concerning the extraterritorial dimensions of the government use ‘license’ with respect to process patents -- but it also leaves a rather worrisome ‘gap’ in the coverage of the basic provisions concerning process patent infringement. Consider these two propositions:

1. In the absence of authorization, where every step of a process patent is practiced in the United States, liability under 35 U.S.C. §271(a) results. However, if any step of a process patent is practiced outside the United States, there is no direct infringement. 
2. Where every step of a process patent is practiced outside the United States and the resulting product is imported into or used within the United States, liability under 35 U.S.C. §271(g) results. 

So here’s the gap (and the facts of Zoltek seem to fall into this gap): if a process patent is practiced partly in the United States and partly outside the United States, there may be no liability. This odd result seems to follow from the text of 35 U.S.C. §271(g), which is triggered by the importation or use of a product.

Talent Wants to be Free: Why We Should Learn to Love Leaks, Raids, and Free-Riding by Orly Lobel

Orly Lobel is not writing about love in Talent Wants to be Free, but she’s not terribly far off topic, for she writes about the suffocating attachments firms can form with their employees. The heart-sickened are told to let go -- and perhaps their beloveds will come back to them. This may be the better course, but it isn’t easy and it certainly isn’t what most of us do (with our insecurities and covetousness). Firms are jealously possessive of their key employees; this is a social fact. Lobel challenges these firms (and the responding legislatures) to consider whether they are indeed pursuing their own best interests by clinging.

Lobel usefully gathers a variety of legal doctrines and instruments into a basket she calls “human capital controls” -- and for this alone her book should be read. Human capital controls include IP and quasi-IP (trade secrets and know-how) rights, as well as a host of contractual features: non-competes, non-disclosure agreements, compensation arrangements (option grants and forfeitures) and post-termination obligations. Together, these elements bind the talented employee to her employer. The orthodox justification for these controls is that they promote firm investment in innovation, including investment in human capital -- that is, in forming the movable productivity of the employee herself. It is the workplace, and not the university, where most valuable human capital is created.

Lobel directly investigates the logic of control -- which is easily conflated with ownership. By controlling human capital, firms capture some of its produce. Creative workers create. In addition, firms withhold these assets from their competitors. According to the received view, employees are rivalrous goods. Lobel challenges this notion (though perhaps not explicitly) -- while we are not public goods, our creations often are.