Hard-forks and governance on the Bitcoin blockchain

By Jeffery Atik

The recent experience of forks and potential forks in response to the various Segregated Witness and blocksize increase proposals highlights the nature of governance on the Bitcoin blockchain. The result of the SegWit / blocksize controversies has been a so-called hard fork on the Bitcoin blockchain, producing two varieties of Bitcoin with a common history but now distinct technical characteristics: Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash.

The Bitcoin blockchain marks a novel form of social organization. There is no central node in the network, no center of authority directing or coordinating internal or external action. Rather, the constituent autonomous nodes operate the Bitcoin blockchain following a downloaded open-source protocol that Bitcoin’s mysterious founders initially developed and which is quite resistant to change. When change does come to the Bitcoin blockchain, it emerges from loose and informal constellations of various stakeholders. Bitcoin users and the sponsors of the Bitcoin network nodes (known as ‘miners’) are formal stakeholders. Indirect stakeholders include Bitcoin developers and businesses that service the Bitcoin ecosystem (systems operators and equipment manufacturers, as well as Bitcoin exchanges). Still we can draw a black box around the Bitcoin blockchain and examine it as a finite social space, an organization set apart from surrounding players and institutions.

The Bitcoin blockchain resorts to “Nakamoto consensus” as its ultimate form of governance. Nakamoto consensus is an emergent and diffuse consensus arising among the active Bitcoin miners, each pursuing its own advantage while collectively engaged in maintaining, verifying and expanding the blockchain. Nakamoto consensus is the ultimate source, and hence authority, as to the canonical state of the Bitcoin blockchain; this consensus is the Truth as far as the Bitcoin blockchain is concerned, and once reached, it cannot readily be disturbed. More considered consensus engages on those occasions when the Bitcoin blockchain community makes a constitutional decision as to changes to its basic rules.

Innovation and keeping old ways on the blockchain: ChromaWay's Swedish Land Registry project - Part 2

By Jeffery Atik

In the development of blockchain applications, we now find ourselves in an exhilarating rush of proofs of concept, of mock-ups and test-beds. Real implementation of major applications on the blockchain (beyond the bitcoin) remain some distance away. And so it is with the Swedish Land Registry project, which is spearheaded by Stockholm's blockchain house ChromaWay.

The Swedish Land Registry project takes the basic 'small house' purchase transaction and proposes placing it on the blockchain. The various parties - the buyer, the seller, the real estate agent, the respective banks and the Land Registry - continue to play the same roles they held in the conventional transactional pattern. No new party is introduced, nor are any parties eliminated. The obvious candidate for elimination in an eventual blockchain-based land conveyancing system would have been the Land Registry itself - which is the chief sponsor of this project. For an agency to contemplate its own demise reflects admirable public spirit. But worry not: the Land Registry will continue to authenticate Swedish land titles. The blockchain merely records (albeit in a permanent and tamper-proof way) the title determinations of the Land Registry. The Land Registry project is a thoughtful inquiry into the blockchain’s potential; it is also a case study of incrementalist innovation, where the general outlines of the familiar are retained.

Trust on the Blockchain: ChromaWay's Swedish Land Registry project - Part 1

ChromaWay is a major innovator in blockchain technology, headquartered in Stockholm. ChromaWay is developing - together with other collaborators - a blockchain-based solution for the Swedish Land Registry. ChromaWay recently completed the second phase of this project (which it calls a "testbed") and has now published a report. Last week I spoke with ChromaWay’s Henrik Hjelte and Ludvig Öberg about the Land Registry project.

The blockchain has been called the "trust machine." In the blockchain’s original application, supporting bitcoin transactions and accounts, there is (it is asserted) no need for counterparties to trust each other. Indeed, counterparties know nothing of each other’s identities beyond their encrypted keys. Nor need they trust the accuracy of the records located on the blockchain; the distributed nature of the blockchain as well as the incentives provided the various nodes assure that tamper-proof records are identically preserved at each node. The blockchain itself is the ultimate reality of bitcoin; bitcoins exist no place else, and one securely owns the quantity of bitcoins the blockchain records. Where there is no need for trust, parties can deal directly and need not rely on intermediaries. The role of trust in more complex applications is more nuanced. While the character of required trust may be altered on the blockchain, the need to trust may not be entirely eliminated.

New directions in Technology Transfer

by Jeffery Atik

There continues to be a flow of academic writing and field studies concerning technology transfer, but there are no great breakthroughs to report. That said, there is an observable tiring with neoliberal approaches (which have failed to unlock the puzzle of incentivizing technology transfer). Moving the discussion to more public (if not statist) approaches to technology transfer might restore promise to what has been a disappointing field.

Collaborations do appear to be a promising institutional response; they have been reportedly successfully deployed in achieving advances in approaches to neglected diseases (such as Ebola) and climate change technologies. Collaborations are inherently public-private and can be structured to include (as full research partners) LDC institutions. These collaborations may feature government entities from the developed world, specialized development agencies, NGOs (who often coordinate), and university and state laboratories. They include private firms that carry out much of the focused technological development. As such, the success of a collaboration (as measured by innovation outcomes) depends on an effective design of incentives. Market-based financial rewards (licensing, sale of firms, IPOs) are replaced by funded contract research (similar to what occurs in defense fields) and/or prizes. Disengaging from the market permits research targeting - the ability to focus the collaboration on LDC needs and circumstances. For technology transfer to result, there must be meaningful inclusion of LDC institutions and personnel in the collaboration. LDC collaborators should not be mere observers; they make important contributions, particularly with regard to molding innovation to match the LDC environment where the technology will be deployed.

Apple loses appeal in e-book antitrust case - Part 3

This is the third and final comment in a series on the Second Circuit’s June 30 decision in the Apple e-books antitrust case.

The Second Circuit's decision in the Apple e-book case contains a rather acrimonious exchange between Judge Debra Livingston (author of the majority opinion) and Judge Dennis Jacobs (the dissenting judge) - which is a bit unfortunate, as there is much to harvest from their debate. The judges directly address each other - and are unsparing in their disdain for the other's theory of the case. Livingston may have the better of the argument (and she in part writes for the majority), but there is much to value in Jacobs's dissent as well. This is the final comment in a series examining the Apple e-book case (Part I and Part 2 of the series examine the background and the majority theory of liability, respectively). This comment examines Judge Jacobs's dissent and the ideas behind it.

Let's first look at the rather broad zone of agreement between Jacobs and the majority of the panel. Jacobs has no illusions about Apple's bruising conduct - he accepts Apple's forceful role in moving e-book distribution towards commissioned agency pricing. But he doesn't view Apple's conduct (when considered together with the e-book publishers) as constituting per se price fixing. Rather, he believes that any agreement among Apple and the e-book publishers should be evaluated according to the Rule of Reason - and he would further find that application of the Rule, given the Amazon-imposed market structure for e-books prior to Apple's iPad introduction, compels discharging Apple of antitrust liability (recall the e-book publishers had settled with the government prior to the litigation, accepting that they at least engaged in questionable pricing behavior).

Apple loses appeal in e-books antitrust case - Part 2

This is the second in a series of comments on the Second Circuit’s June 30 decision in the Apple e-books antitrust case.

The Second Circuit has upheld a federal trial court finding that Apple, together with five of the so-called "Big Six" publishing companies, fixed prices for e-book editions of new issues and New York Times best sellers. The e-book reader market had been (and continues to be) dominated by Amazon's Kindle platform, first introduced in 2007; Kindle is an e-bookstore, an e-book format (including a digital rights management system), a cloud-based storage system, and a suite of e-readers. When Apple introduced its more general purpose iPad in 2010, it commenced competing with Amazon's Kindle across all these dimensions. Importantly, Apple sought to distribute e-books and so required access to the major publishers' catalog.

Amazon had been selling most new release and New York Times bestseller e-books below cost, attracting legions of readers to the Kindle ecosystem with its $9.99 pricing. Apple cleverly upset Amazon's $9.99 pricing policy by positioning itself as a sales agent (and not a retailer) of e-books, taking a 30% commission on sales. Apple thus generally restored retail pricing authority to the publishers. Apple's agency contracts, however. required e-book retail prices on iPad to match those offered on Amazon. This 'most favored nation' obligation drove the publishers to renegotiate their distribution deals with Amazon. Collectively (and with Apple playing an active coordinating role), the book publishers placed Amazon on an agency basis as well. The publishers then immediately raised e-book retail prices across both platforms - a surprising result in a market that appeared to be growing more competitive through the introduction of the iPad.

Apple loses appeal in e-books antitrust case

This is the first of a series of comments on the Second Circuit’s June 30, 2015 decision in the Apple e-books antitrust case.

Through a series of spectacular commercial moves, Apple succeeded in disrupting the e-book space upon its 2009 release of the iPad, sweeping away Amazon Kindle’s popular $9.99 pricing for new releases and for New York Times best-sellers. The iPad brought meaningful competition to Amazon’s wildly successful Kindle as an e-book platform; the emergence of this new distribution channel raised e-book prices, whether purchased on iPads or Kindles, seemingly defying an economic law of gravity. It was a coup that only a Steve Jobs could pull off. The e-book price shift attracted the attention of federal and state antitrust authorities. In 2012, the government brought a civil antitrust action against Apple and five major publishers. The book publishers settled, and the government proceeded in a price fixing claim against Apple. On June 30, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a federal trial court’s finding that Apple violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Flash Boys - A Wall Street Revolt by Michael Lewis

Flash Boys is the latest from Michael Lewis; it's a pointedly literary business book featuring arresting characters, punchy (though not always credible) dialogue, and a comforting good versus evil story line. It’s the kind of financial journalism that could trigger movie royalties. The Flash Boys themselves don’t appear in the book. They are the shadowy ‘high frequency traders’ (HFTs) found within dark pools and hedge funds. HFTs use computer power and unfathomable speed to score the tiny transactional profits that form the bases of great fortunes. And – in the view of Lewis’ characters – the Flash Boys aren’t playing fairly.

High frequency trading occurs so fast that ‘after’ becomes ‘before’ in a way that seems to challenge our conventional sense of time. The Flash Boys appear able to mysteriously know what we intend to carry out in the market before we do it – and it is almost so. In the simplest case described by Lewis, a conventional purchaser of a large block of shares will see its order fragmented into small transactions arrayed at various (usually escalating) prices. The lowest price attracts the first execution. An offer is dangled by the high frequency trader as bait – small quantities of shares (often the minimum 100 share order) at alluring prices. As the trap snaps closed, that is, as the token trade is executed and reported, it signals to the high frequency trader that an active buyer has likely entered the market. The high frequency trader (which has just sold the unwitting purchaser a small quantity of shares) then uses speed (built literally on proximity to stock exchange servers) to outrun the execution of the greater bulk of the purchaser’s order – buying up shares at available prices and then reselling these to the purchaser at higher prices – all within a tiny fraction of a second. The unwitting market participant betrays herself; revealing in one instant what will likely follow in the next.

So this is the market behavior Lewis has uncovered – he then proceeds to build story around it. In the first story, a mysterious entrepreneur lays fiber cable in the straightest possible line between the commodities markets in Chicago and the trading desks (that is, computers) in New Jersey, resulted in the fastest possible electronic connection. The second – and main – story involves a host of good-guy bankers attached to the New York outpost of the Royal Bank of Canada. They are a motley crew of outsiders, including Brad Katsuyama, the Japanese-Canadian (“of all things”) leader of the band, and Ronan Ryan, an Irish (not Irish-American) techie turned trader, who uncover and counter the traps laid by the Flash Boys. Their solution to HFT predation is in part technical (they gain better pricing by slowing things down), but is largely premised on creating a trading space called IEX with fairer rules.

Licensing Notes - introduction to the essential facilities doctrine

In this note, we prepare for our coverage of the Trinko case with an introduction to the essential facilities doctrine.

Let’s start will two fairly clear propositions about patent and copyright law in the United States. The first is that the proprietor of a patent or a copyright controls the extent to which she exploits her intellectual property. She need never manufacture or publish; there is no working requirement in U.S. law. And the proprietor may assign all or part of her IP rights to others. But there is no obligation to do so. A patent or copyright holder need not share her IP with anyone. To use the language of antitrust, there is no duty to deal, no duty to license.

Now the second proposition. A proprietor of a patent or copyright who chooses to exploit her intellectual property right -- whether directly or by means of a license to another -- may charge ‘what the market will bear.’ There are no limits -- imposed by either intellectual property law or antitrust law -- on the amount of license royalties that can be demanded.

Both of these propositions -- the freedom to license (or not) and the freedom to set royalties -- are seen to flow naturally from the very monopolies that patent and copyright law establish. A patent or copyright generates a set of exclusive rights. To require the proprietor to license to another is inconsistent with those exclusivities and undercuts the monopoly the intellectual property creates. A limit on royalties reduces the economic reward conferred by Congress on authors and inventors.

TTIP's IP Chapter: Nothing to be Gained (Part 2)

It would not be difficult to convince the various constituencies arrayed against the expansion of intellectual property rights to support the removal of the IP chapter from the projected U.S.-European Union free trade agreement (known as TTIP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). Open source advocates, First Amendment partisans, pirates and free riders, as well as ordinary American consumers, see little to be gained from yet another international commitment to strong IP. Eliminating the IP chapter from TTIP should appeal to the U.S. IP industries as well. There is little to gain, and perhaps much to lose, in including an IP component to TTIP. IP zealots (and I'm talking to you, Hollywood) might be better served to await a better day.

As I argued in part 1 of this essay, there is little ground the European counterparty is politically willing or able to give in any TTIP IP negotiations. The TTIP IP chapter is a lightning rod for anti-globalists - and the European Parliament will guard the populist victory it won in quashing ACTA. And neither the United States nor the European Union seem ready to undertake the extremely difficult task of harmonizing substantive IP law across the Atlantic. The Americans and the Europeans seem to share a resignation to let "vivre la différence” in substantive IP rules; each of course would be satisfied by a wholesale capitulation to its respective IP model, yet each recognizes the impossibility of such an outcome. Impending EU substantive IP harmonization - in patent and copyright - pursued through the EU legislative process might be a more favorable opportunity to highlight (with a light touch, of course) the gains to be achieved through transatlantic IP convergence (admittedly moving EU IP law closer to U.S. models).

Leaked reports suggest some Europeans see possibilities for U.S. movement in TTIP with regard to geographical indications (GIs). Perhaps. But the United States clearly recognizes the intense desire of certain European interests for a stronger GI regime (especially with regard to wines). The United States will likely make painful demands of the European Union before making concessions on GIs.

In the end, there is not much new nor important that can form the IP chapter of TTIP beyond simply restating the ongoing general commitment of the United States and the European Union to a high standard of IP protection. And there is a downside to a modest agreement (again from the perspective of those U.S. industries seeking a global advancement in the protection and enforcement of IP rights).

TTIP’s IP Chapter: Nothing to be Gained (Part 1)

President Obama announced in his 2013 State of the Union address that negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a United States-European Union free trade agreement, were on. There is something silly about calling a trade agreement a 'partnership;' the on-going Trans-Pacific Partnership uses this same label. But the folks in Washington are more clever than you and me: they know that the older style ‘free trade agreement’ (FTA) would be DOA in Congress.

TTIP’s central features follow the FTA model. Little thought seems to have been applied to fixing the provisional TTIP agenda: TTIP would provide for zero-level tariffs for U.S.-EU trade, an address various non-tariff barriers between the United States and the EU, introduce a misbegotten investor-state arbitration mechanism, and include an intellectual property chapter. It appears now that little positive can be achieved from inserting an IP chapter into TTIP. It is at best a waste of time -- and could undercut U.S. and EU IP efforts in other fora. What were they thinking?

In this first post, I examine the constraints faced by European Union negotiators. The EU has precious little room for maneuver on the IP front; IP provisions can only attract and intensify opposition to the entire TTIP package. These political limits are clear to the Europeans; they are perhaps underappreciated by the U.S. proponents of TTIP's IP coverage.

Federal conviction for trade secret theft? A comment on Nosal by Karl Manheim and Jeffery Atik

Stealing a trade secret (reprehensible though this may be) has generally not attracted federal criminal liability. Yet in the recent prosecution of David Nosal, the Justice Department applied a computer hacking statute to convict a departing employee for a rather run-of-the-mill trade secret theft: the unauthorized taking of customer lists. Many if not most trade secrets -- like the customer lists involved in Nosal -- are stored on computers. As such, aggressive use of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act could convert many trade secret misappropriations -- traditionally civil offenses and a state law matter -- into federal crimes. And this policy shift -- criminalizing and federalizing -- results from the determinations of prosecutors and judges, and not from Congress.

For more of this comment, see Theft of Trade Secrets Brings Federal Conviction on Loyola Law School's faculty blog, Summary Judgments.

The Electronic Silk Road: How the Web Binds the World Together in Commerce by Anupam Chander

I saw a caravan once, in Afghanistan. It was a little caravan: three camels and a small family. But it was enough of a caravan to invoke in my imagination the Old Silk Road. I wondered (until a French officer ordered me to leave the area) where the travelers came from and where they were headed. All I could take away was their direction of travel: East.

In the Electronic Silk Road, Anupam Chander describes digital trade routes. The new trade proceeds along electronic pathways; it is fiber and cable and not camels that transmits value across great distances. But the Electronic Silk Road Chander studies has a marked geography; place still matters. We find Silicon Valley and Bangalore and (as before) China, marking the major stops and starts along the way (Chander likes the word entrepôt).

And the poles of the Electronic Silk Road, like the Old Silk Road, have valency. Chinese goods seduced the West for centuries: spices and trade goods and the silk that gave name to the trading route. The problem for the West was China’s notorious indifference to Western goods -- the West did not produce much the Chinese wished to have. Money was only a partial solution. It could of course pay for Chinese goods, but money, even in the days of gold and silver, was effectively a future claim on the West held by China. The Old Silk Road did not fit the mercantilist design of offsetting streams of goods.

The Sovereign Citizen: Denaturalization and the Origins of the American Republic by Patrick Weil

We each deploy an array of identities in forming our social selves -- we can be, say, a Methodist and also a Southerner, and black and a civil engineer and gay. And all of this and still an American. Each aspect distinguishes us; together they individuate us. No single identity -- even that of our nationality -- adequately describes who we are, how we see ourselves. In these times, we no longer see the possession of one nationality as excluding another; many have more than one nationality. We can be both French and American; one does not displace the other in the modern imagination. (A nod to the late Tom Franck here, who explored these themes, personally and in his writings on nationality.)

Yet certain identities have been viewed as inherently incompatible with the holding of the fullest form of American national identity: U.S. citizenship. At various times one could not be an anarchist or an Asian or a Nazi or a communist and become (or perhaps remain) an American. Patrick Weil examines these disabling identities in The Sovereign Citizen, a thorough history of U.S. naturalization law. His emphasis lies with denaturalization: that is, the legal reversal of the grant of U.S. citizenship to an alien. For much of the 20th century, the recourse to denaturalization expands in parallel with the stiffening of opportunities for immigration. The vulnerability to denaturalization marked the ‘second class’ nature of U.S. citizenship acquired through naturalization; the hold of U.S born citizens on their nationality was (and continues to be) more secure. Denaturalization as a broad practice then collapses: from the Warren Court onward denaturalization has become an exceptional act.

Our view of citizenship shifted during the 20th century. It began as an exclusive (if not jealous) relationship between the United States and its nationals, characterized by duty and loyalty. These understandings differ from today’s far more easygoing tolerance (if not encouragement) of multiple nationalities and distributed allegiance. Weil’s book explores and the targets and the techniques of denaturalization.

Extraterritorial Government Use of U.S. Process Patents after Zoltek

The federal government -- and its contractors and subcontractors -- have long enjoyed an effective ‘compulsory license’ for the use or manufacture of inventions covered by a U.S. patent. 28 U.S.C. §1498 relaxes the government’s sovereign immunity and supplies a special remedy to the patent holder. The patent holder may recover reasonable compensation from the federal government for the use or manufacture. Thus, a government contractor can carry out a contract without concern for an infringement action; the government will answer any patent holder’s claims.

The operation of Section 1498 applies to both product and process patents. Section 1498 contains an express limitation to any claims ‘arising in a foreign country.’ This limitation, as well as the territorial limitation found in the basic patent infringement statute [35 U.S.C. §271(a)], and their interpretation with respect to process patents, were the basis of the dispute between Zoltek Corporation and the federal government.

The eventual resolution of the Zoltek litigation by the Federal Circuit [672 F.3d 1309] settles various questions of interpretation concerning the extraterritorial dimensions of the government use ‘license’ with respect to process patents -- but it also leaves a rather worrisome ‘gap’ in the coverage of the basic provisions concerning process patent infringement. Consider these two propositions:

1. In the absence of authorization, where every step of a process patent is practiced in the United States, liability under 35 U.S.C. §271(a) results. However, if any step of a process patent is practiced outside the United States, there is no direct infringement. 
2. Where every step of a process patent is practiced outside the United States and the resulting product is imported into or used within the United States, liability under 35 U.S.C. §271(g) results. 

So here’s the gap (and the facts of Zoltek seem to fall into this gap): if a process patent is practiced partly in the United States and partly outside the United States, there may be no liability. This odd result seems to follow from the text of 35 U.S.C. §271(g), which is triggered by the importation or use of a product.

Talent Wants to be Free: Why We Should Learn to Love Leaks, Raids, and Free-Riding by Orly Lobel

Orly Lobel is not writing about love in Talent Wants to be Free, but she’s not terribly far off topic, for she writes about the suffocating attachments firms can form with their employees. The heart-sickened are told to let go -- and perhaps their beloveds will come back to them. This may be the better course, but it isn’t easy and it certainly isn’t what most of us do (with our insecurities and covetousness). Firms are jealously possessive of their key employees; this is a social fact. Lobel challenges these firms (and the responding legislatures) to consider whether they are indeed pursuing their own best interests by clinging.

Lobel usefully gathers a variety of legal doctrines and instruments into a basket she calls “human capital controls” -- and for this alone her book should be read. Human capital controls include IP and quasi-IP (trade secrets and know-how) rights, as well as a host of contractual features: non-competes, non-disclosure agreements, compensation arrangements (option grants and forfeitures) and post-termination obligations. Together, these elements bind the talented employee to her employer. The orthodox justification for these controls is that they promote firm investment in innovation, including investment in human capital -- that is, in forming the movable productivity of the employee herself. It is the workplace, and not the university, where most valuable human capital is created.

Lobel directly investigates the logic of control -- which is easily conflated with ownership. By controlling human capital, firms capture some of its produce. Creative workers create. In addition, firms withhold these assets from their competitors. According to the received view, employees are rivalrous goods. Lobel challenges this notion (though perhaps not explicitly) -- while we are not public goods, our creations often are.

Hunting Season: Immigration and Murder in an all-American Town by Mirta Ojito and The Winter of Our Discontent by John Steinbeck

In Hunting Season, Mirta Ojito tells the horrific story of the killing of an Ecuadorian immigrant, Marcelo Lucero, in Patchogue, Long Island at the hands of a group of brutish teenagers. It is a small-town story with international reverberations. At first blush, it is an investigation of American intolerance for the other run wild. Lucero was a poor, hard-working man, searching for a better life. His attackers are themselves lost souls, largely unknown to one another prior to the evening of Lucero’s killing. Each kid seems to lack the basic human understanding that there is something wrong with beating up a man simply because he is a ‘beaner.’ Patchogue is or was a community where the blood sport of attacking random Latinos goes unremarked. It is a dreadful story Ojito presents, and Patchogue appears as a dreadful place.

So what has happened in Patchogue? What does the killing of Lucero constitute? The knife-wielding 17-year-old points to his Latina girlfriend to demonstrate his open mind. Another attacker is both Puerto Rican and black -- the kids embrace him as their friend. Our American experience with racism -- and hence hate crimes -- largely involves victims from established and permanent communities (including the native community). Nativist violence may fall into a different category. The Patchogue 7 conceded they identified and attacked Lucero because of his ethnicity -- but there seems to be more that drew Lucero into their trap. They also understood that Lucero was a foreigner -- and likely one with a shaky immigration status. Lucero’s vulnerability invites this community reprisal.

Post-Financial Crisis Spiritual Reading: the 2013 FT/Goldman Sachs Best Business Book Award

The readers of business books are a fragile lot. They’re uncertain of their talents and the scope of human possibility, confused as to direction (they’re largely not one-percenters). Their anxieties lead them to seek reassurance - from authors who project an understandable and manageable world. It is little surprise that business books resemble spiritual books - they are marked by a confident if not omniscient tone, they judge the unrighteous, they show us the way. The six finalists for the 2013 Financial Times/Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award extend these comforts.

For more of this essay, see "Post-Financial Crisis Spiritual Reading" at the Los Angeles Review of Books.

On November 18, the 2013 Financial Times/Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award was awarded to Brad Stone for The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon.

See my Attraverso review of The Everything Store here.

And you can find below links to my reviews of the five other finalists:

• Neil Irwin, The Alchemists
• Iain Martin, Making It Happen: Fred Goodwin, RBS and the Men Who Blew Up the British Economy
• Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data
• Anita Raghavan, The Billionaire’s Apprentice: The Rise of the Indian-American Elite and the Fall of the Galleon Hedge Fund 
• Sheryl Sandberg, Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead

The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon by Brad Stone

Brad Stone’s treatment, The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon, is the talk of the business press this week. Jeff Bezos’ wife, MacKenzie Bezos, posted a ‘one-star review’ of the book on the Amazon site. In it, she expresses concerns about the book’s ‘factual inaccuracies’ and ‘narrative tricks.’ While she certainly had a better view of the recounted events than did Stone, her objections seem quibbling. This is a thoughtful and well researched book, with a surprisingly balanced tone: Stone neither praises Jeff Bezos nor does he bury Bezos.

Stone’s book is both a CEO biography and a corporate history. Bezos is the exception that proves the rule; he is the visionary founder who wasn’t pushed aside for a professional ('adult') manager. And given Bezos’ continuity at the helm of Amazon, one can fairly charge much of Amazon’s success -- and its bullying behavior -- to Bezos.

Stone’s book is a prosecutor’s dream -- it is a catalog of unfair business offenses (were such behavior disciplined today). There is a zone of indeterminacy involved in most bargaining: between the terms a party would accept and the better terms a party might exact (before driving the other party away). Bezos is shown to consistently drive for the very best outcome in Amazon’s dealings -- where the greater part of the joint benefit falls to Amazon and a bare minimum is left for the ‘cooperating’ counterpart. Perhaps this is to be admired; we’d all like to be ‘tough bargainers.’ But Bezos (as depicted by Stone) doesn’t pull punches. He is capable of ‘refusing to deal.’ He applies price pressure against smaller firms. He levers Amazon’s immense power against competitors and partners.

Euro Money as Euro Language

This is the first of a series of reflections on the social meaning of the Euro.

Investigations of the social character of money often feature an analogy to language. Like words, money forms intelligible signs. Money, like language, is a critical medium of social exchange. Money, like language, is constitutive of identity: the particular kind of money we use, in part, makes us who we are. And money, like language, is both stable and unstable over space and time.

The architects of the European Monetary System (EMS) anticipated that the Euro would serve as an institution around which a European consciousness could be built. The Euro (at least in its material forms) functions like the EU flag or the EU passport to construct a new identity that plays on commonplace nationalist expectations. That is, when we see flags or passports or money, we have been acculturated to expect national sponsorship. The European Union thus displaces the traditional state in presenting itself through these institutions; if not precisely declaring itself to be a state, the European Union is, at a minimum, asserting that it is like a state for various intents and purposes.

But notice the peculiarly assertive case of the Euro. The EU flag often flies alongside the traditional flags of the EU Member States. The EU passport is formally issued by the respective member states: while it prominently features “European Union” on its harmonized cover, it also bears the name of the relevant member state. The EU passport in fact overstates the EU nature of the document. A passport begs the admission of a members state’s nationals into another state’s territory; it is only secondarily evidence of nationality (and in the case of EU passports, evidence of the bearer’s status as an EU citizen). Through flags and passports, the EU and the relevant EU member state co-occupy a space in the EU citizen’s imagination that had been occupied by the state alone.